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Most people think of preemp-tion as a technical, consti-tutional doctrine, but it is 
pivotally important to health and safety 
and opens the door to broad judicial 
discretion. The Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts’ jurisprudence, with its support 
for both business and preemption, has 
been distinctly antiregulatory, invali-
dating major state public health rules 
in occupational safety, tobacco control, 
and motor vehicle safety, among other 
things.1 And apart from these antiregu-
latory stances, the Supreme Court has 
also been maddeningly inconsistent. 
Consider three relatively recent cases.
In its 2008 decision in Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., the Court held that 
federal law bars injured consumers from 
challenging the safety or effectiveness of 
medical devices approved by the Food 
and Drug Administration.2 A year later, 
however, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court 
came to the opposite conclusion, rul-
ing that injured consumers could sue 
pharmaceutical companies for failing 
to warn about the risks of taking brand-
name drugs.3 Yet on June 23, 2011, 
in PLIVA, Inc., v. Mensing, the Court 
found that injured consumers could 
not bring failure-to-warn claims for in-
juries caused by FDA-approved generic 
pharmaceuticals.4 Thus, in less than 
four years, the Court barred state health 
and safety litigation for FDA-approved 
medical devices, allowed failure-to-warn 
claims for branded pharmaceuticals, 
and then barred those same claims for 
generic pharmaceuticals.5
What is the rational basis for treat-
ing brand-name and generic medicines 
differently when, by law, the products 
must be equivalent? Or for treating 
brand-name drugs and medical devices 
differently even though they go through 
similar approval processes? As Justice 
Sotomayor (dissenting in PLIVA) put 
it, this “leads to so many absurd conse-
quences that I cannot fathom that Con-
gress would have intended to preempt 
state law,” while even Justice Thomas, 
writing for the Court, admitted this 
outcome “makes little sense.”
In order to figure out how we 
reached this predicament, let’s take a 
step back and find out more about the 
perversion of the preemption doctrine, 
the newest ruling on generic medicines, 
and the public health value of consumer 
litigation.
Public Health and Preemption
Preemption is a doctrine undergird-ed by the supremacy clause, which 
holds that federal law prevails over state 
law if there is a conflict. The two cor-
nerstones of preemption are Congress’s 
intent as the “ultimate touchstone” and 
the strong presumption against preemp-
tion when the state exercises its historic 
police powers.
The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly perverted these two key criteria. 
Congress intended for federal and state 
food and drug regulation to work side 
by side, each providing a significant yet 
distinct layer of consumer protection. If 
Congress thought state lawsuits posed 
an obstacle to its objectives, it surely 
would have said so explicitly at some 
point during the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act’s seventy-year history. How 
could Congress have intended such ir-
rational inconsistencies between brand-
name and generic drugs? 
Is it reasonable for the nation’s high-
est court to conclude that Congress ac-
tually intended to bar injured patients 
from judicial recourse against compa-
nies that, knowing the risks, aggressive-
ly market hazardous drugs or medical 
devices? The public might express even 
greater skepticism if tort immunity were 
granted to corporations that defraud 
the agency. But that is precisely the 
position of the Supreme Court, which 
permits a corporation to use FDA ap-
proval as a shield against litigation even 
if it deceived the agency into granting 
that approval. In Buckman Company v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, the Court 
held that state law fraud-on-the-FDA 
claims were preempted.6 The Court 
split four against four when asked if 
consumer litigation was also preempted 
when drug companies defraud the agen-
cy.7 Since Chief Justice Roberts did not 
participate in the decision, the Court 
would likely side with the pharmaceu-
tical industry, even if it intentionally 
hides safety data.
Consumer safety regulation, more-
over, is a classic state police power. State 
public health regulation has a long his-
tory and remains a robust activity to-
day. The common law has traditionally 
granted causes of action for consumer 
products that are defective or for which 
companies fail to adequately disclose 
known risks. And although the Court 
admonishes against preemption of state 
safety rules, it did not even mention this 
doctrine in Riegel, PLIVA, or Buckman. 
The Irrational Consequences of 
PLIVA
In the aftermath of PLIVA, an injured consumer’s access to the civil justice 
at law
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system turns solely on “the happen-
stance of whether her pharmacist filled 
her prescription with a brand-name 
drug or a generic.”8 Yet 78 percent of 
all prescription drugs dispensed are ge-
nerics, and with patents expiring this 
year on blockbuster drugs like Lipitor, 
Plavix, and Zyprexa, the generic market 
share will rise further.9 This is happen-
ing by design—the express purpose of 
the Hatch-Waxman Amendments is 
to make generic drugs affordable and 
available. State law, moreover, autho-
rizes pharmacists to substitute generic 
for brand-name drugs when filling pre-
scriptions. Currently, the prescriptions 
for more than 90 percent of drugs for 
which a generic version exists are filled 
with generics. Consequently, most con-
sumers harmed by medications now 
lack access to justice.
Generic manufacturers—often large, 
multinational companies—now have 
little incentive to monitor and disclose 
safety risks. Brand-name manufacturers 
also may leave the market once the ge-
neric version is available, so no one will 
have the incentive to strengthen warn-
ing labels or to remove dangerous prod-
ucts from the market. 
The Value of Consumer Safety 
Litigation
Why do we need litigation when the FDA already has a duty to pro-
tect the public’s safety? Lawsuits bring 
advantages for the agency as well as for 
consumers because gaping resource and 
informational deficits hamper its over-
sight. The FDA’s responsibilities are vast 
and cover 25 percent of all consumer 
spending, including food, drugs, vac-
cines, and medical devices. Yet it lacks 
adequate staffing and resources, even as 
its mandate and public safety concerns 
continue to increase, and it does not 
have the information it needs for effec-
tive oversight. Consequently, it is forced 
to rely on manufacturers to find and 
disclose hazards.
Further hampering the FDA’s over-
sight is the fact that its approval deci-
sions consider relatively small numbers 
in clinical trials, so that any given drug’s 
full safety and effectiveness profile 
emerges only after it is marketed to a 
large population. Tort litigants, unlike 
the FDA, have subpoena power, and 
discovery can be a potent way to inform 
the agency and public of undisclosed 
risks. Litigation can also be socially and 
politically mobilizing: uncovering poor 
industry practices can drive regulatory 
reform.
These resource and informational 
deficits have resulted in high-profile 
regulatory failures involving the FDA-
approved COX-2 selective nonsteroidal 
anti-inflammatory drugs Vioxx and Ce-
lebrex, the type 2 diabetes drug Avandia, 
and the Dalkon Shield intrauterine de-
vice. In 2009, the FDA issued a “black 
box warning” about the very drug at 
issue in PLIVA—metoclopramide, also 
known as Reglan. Litigation revealed 
that manufacturers knew the risks but 
did not promptly inform the FDA. 
State tort law provides a system of civil 
justice designed to compensate patients, 
deter unreasonably hazardous conduct, 
and encourage innovation in product 
design, packaging, labeling, and ad-
vertising. Tort law, therefore, closes 
regulatory gaps in the FDA’s premarket 
approval process, providing much-need-
ed postmarketing surveillance.
In the end, the public is caught in a 
catch-22. While the FDA is perceived 
as ineffectual and the hazards of widely-
used drugs and devices continue to be 
revealed, the Supreme Court makes it 
harder for patients to discover wrongdo-
ing—even fraud—and to be fairly com-
pensated for their avoidable injuries.
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